Fixed in one port, open in the other: PraisonAI’s unauthenticated AgentOS server
The TypeScript port of an agent server got a CVE and a fix for binding to every interface with no auth. The Python port kept the same defaults, so the documented quickstart served agent system prompts and agent invocation to anyone on the network.
Context: Sibling-port variant of CVE-2026-61426 (GHSA-6wjp-v33h-5cvq), fixed in the npm/TypeScript port only
- Advisory
- GHSA-jj5m-4rrg-3w6v
- Affected
- praisonai (PyPI) <= 4.7.15 and praisonaiagents (PyPI) <= 1.7.13, patched in praisonai 4.8.0 / praisonaiagents 1.8.0
- Weakness
- CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) / CWE-1188 · Insecure Default Initialization of Resource
- Reading
- ~6 min · 20 Nov 2026
Credit: I was the sole reporter on this advisory. The maintainer closed it as already fixed: the fix landed in PR #6337 and shipped in 4.8.0. The maintainer thanked me by handle in the 4.8.0 release notes, among the reporters whose findings were confirmed and already fixed. No CVE was assigned for this report.
When a project ships the same product in two languages, a security fix in one of them tells you where to look in the other. PraisonAI has a TypeScript port and a Python port of its “AgentOS” agent server. The TypeScript one got a CVE for binding to every network interface with no authentication, and it was fixed. The Python one had the same defaults and the same missing guard, and it didn’t get that fix.
This is the “sibling port” kind of incomplete fix. I covered the general method in variant analysis of incomplete fixes. This post walks through one case, and also explains why insecure defaults cost more on AI agent servers than on most software.
A little theory: the default is the security policy
Most software runs exactly as it ships. People copy the quickstart, it works, and they move on. So whatever the defaults are (the bind address, whether auth is on) becomes the real security posture of the typical deployment. MITRE has a name for this: CWE-1188, Insecure Default Initialization of Resource.
“You can turn on authentication” is not a control if authentication is off by default. Two defaults make it worse together:
- Bind address.
127.0.0.1means only this machine can connect.0.0.0.0means every interface: the LAN, the container network, and the internet if the host has a public IP or a forwarded port. - Auth that only turns on when configured. If the server adds its auth layer only when a key exists, then “no key” quietly means “no auth”, not “refuse to start”.
Put them together and you get CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function, and the deployer never chose it.
Why agent servers make it worse
A normal web app with an open endpoint leaks some data. An open agent server leaks more:
- System prompts. An agent’s instructions often hold the deployer’s prompt engineering, guardrails, business rules, and sometimes pasted-in context or secrets. Reading them also makes jailbreaking that agent easier.
- Tool invocation. Invoking an agent means invoking every tool it has: file access, HTTP fetching, code execution, database queries. Anyone who can chat with the agent can try to steer those tools with prompt injection.
- Cost abuse. Every request spends the deployer’s LLM API credit. An open chat endpoint is a free proxy to a paid model.
The concrete finding
AgentOS is PraisonAI’s HTTP server for exposing agents, teams, and flows. The config class AgentAppConfig (exported as AgentOSConfig) in praisonaiagents/app/config.py shipped with these defaults:
host: str = "0.0.0.0" # binds all interfaces
api_key: Optional[str] = None # no key by default_create_app() in praisonai/app/agentos.py registered every route first, and added the API-key middleware only if a key existed:
self._register_routes(app)
launch_token = self.config.api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_AGENTOS_API_KEY")
if launch_token:
app.add_middleware(build_api_key_middleware(launch_token, {"/health", "/"}))serve() then bound to host or self.config.host, which is 0.0.0.0, and nothing stopped a public bind without a key. With the documented quickstart and no key set, these endpoints were open to anyone who could reach the port:
| Endpoint | What an unauthenticated caller gets |
|---|---|
GET /api/agents |
Each agent’s name, role and instructions (the system prompt) |
POST /api/chat |
Runs an agent |
WS /api/chat/stream |
Runs an agent with streaming output |
POST /api/teams/{team}/run |
Runs a team |
POST /api/flows/{flow}/run |
Runs a flow |
GET / |
Agent names |
The TypeScript port had the same root cause, published as CVE-2026-61426 / GHSA-6wjp-v33h-5cvq. The fix there had two parts: the default host became 127.0.0.1, and a 0.0.0.0 bind without a key was refused. The Python port got neither.
Proving it
I confirmed it live on praisonai 4.7.15 / praisonaiagents 1.7.13. The victim runs the quickstart:
from praisonai import AgentOS
from praisonaiagents import Agent
AgentOS(agents=[Agent(name="assistant", instructions="<secret system prompt>")]).serve(port=9000)Any host on the network, with no credentials:
curl http://VICTIM:9000/api/agents
# 200 {"agents":[{"name":"assistant","role":"Assistant","instructions":"<secret system prompt>"}]}
curl -X POST http://VICTIM:9000/api/chat -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"message":"..."}'
# 200 (agent invoked)I also checked with FastAPI’s TestClient against a real AgentOS app built with the default config. GET /api/agents returned 200 with the full instructions, and the app’s middleware stack had no auth middleware at all.
How to find this in your own code
- Sibling ports. When a project ships the same server in two languages (Python and TypeScript SDKs, a CLI and a library, a desktop and a server build), read every security advisory for one port and check the matching code in the others. Fixes rarely land in all of them at once.
- Grep the defaults. Look for
host = "0.0.0.0",--host 0.0.0.0anduvicorn.run(..., host="0.0.0.0")in config classes and CLI defaults. Then look at the auth setup next to it. - Treat conditional auth as a warning sign. The pattern is
if api_key: app.add_middleware(auth). Ask what happens when the key is empty. If the answer is “the server runs anyway, open, on all interfaces”, that’s the bug. - Test the built app, not the docs. Build the app with default config and list its middleware, or call a protected route without a token. The documentation says what can be secured. The default build shows what is.
- For agent servers, list what an anonymous caller can reach: prompt-listing endpoints, chat endpoints, and anything that runs a team, flow or tool.
The fix
The fix shipped in PraisonAI 4.8.0 via PR #6337 (merge commit 95bc0a7). Based on the public PR:
AgentAppConfig.hostnow defaults to127.0.0.1instead of0.0.0.0.serve()fails closed. It raisesRuntimeErroron a non-loopback host when the app it serves was built without an API key (fromAgentOSConfig.api_keyorPRAISONAI_AGENTOS_API_KEY). The key is recorded when the app is built, so a cached app can’t get around the check.- Before starting, the server logs the host, the port, and whether auth is on.
- The
praisonai appCLI’s--hostdefault also moved to127.0.0.1. (The PR notes that one fallback CLI path still defaults to0.0.0.0, but now fails closed when no API key is set.)
To expose the server on purpose, for example in Docker, you now set host="0.0.0.0" and an API key. A public bind without a key is refused. The 4.8.0 release notes apply the same rule to every built-in server: loopback by default, and a token required for any non-loopback bind.
The pattern to copy: refuse an unsafe combination at startup instead of quietly running in it. A server that won’t start on 0.0.0.0 without a key protects the people who never read the docs; a warning in the docs does not.
Impact
Anyone who ran the documented AgentOS quickstart on praisonai <= 4.7.15 without setting an API key served these to every host that could reach the port:
- System prompt disclosure (CWE-200): the deployer’s instructions, guardrails and any embedded context.
- Unauthenticated agent, team and flow execution: LLM cost abuse, plus a way to steer whatever tools the agents have through prompt injection, up to data exfiltration through those tools.
How bad it gets depends on what the agents can do and how reachable the host is. A laptop on a home network is a small risk. A cloud VM or a container with a published port is a much larger one.
Disclosure timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-10-19 | Reported via GitHub private advisory (GHSA-jj5m-4rrg-3w6v) |
| 2026-11-14 | Fix PR #6337 merged |
| 2026-11-19 | PraisonAI 4.8.0 released (praisonai 4.8.0 / praisonaiagents 1.8.0); release notes thank the reporter |
| 2026-11-19 | Advisory closed as already fixed, no CVE assigned |
| 2026-11-20 | This write-up |
References
- PR #6337: AgentOS fails closed on public bind without auth, defaults to loopback (merge commit
95bc0a7) - PraisonAI 4.8.0 release notes (security hardening release; reporters thanked)
- GHSA-6wjp-v33h-5cvq (CVE-2026-61426): the same root cause in the npm/TypeScript port
- Variant analysis of incomplete fixes
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
- CWE-1188: Insecure Default Initialization of Resource
Takeaway
A fix in one port is a bug report for the others.
When a project ships the same server twice, check that each security fix landed in every copy, and make the safe default refuse to start rather than run open.